Additional information:
community in which citizens would not only be free to express their religious belief in a way denied them under the former regime of Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali but would also live under a state that defended their religious values. It was an assertion of a particular definition of Tunisian identity as Arab-Islamic, with its claim to cultural authenticity. It was a critique of what was perceived as the imposed, secular, Westernised modernisation of the previous regimes, but also an effort to enter modernity through a different, Arab-Islamic path. This article draws on interviews conducted during fieldtrips in 2013 with several Ennahdha representatives and politicians from rival secular parties, as well as Ennahdha party literature, to investigate the origins and development of Ennahdha's position on freedom of expression. It proposes that 'protection of the sacred' should be seen as an important element in the post-Islamist evolution of Ennahdha and argues that this concept has become key to the movement's project of cultural authenticity. This is part of an ongoing and often ambiguous process by the movement to reposition itself for a post-2011 democratic setting, a process likely to be constrained both by the political environment and by internal arguments among its members. It is both defensive, in that it seeks to rally differing views within the movement behind a commonly-agreed objective, but also a sign of evolution and adaptation as the movement recasts itself in the light of the new political freedoms on offer and the new compromises required in the post-uprising political process.
A post-Islamist evolution
Ennahdha's position on freedom of expression emerges out of two overlapping contexts, the first of which is a region-wide phenomenon often described as 'post-Islamism'. We may broadly define Islamism as a political ideology that advocates for control of the state in order to impose an Islamic order under sharia law. This covers a wide spectrum from violent jihadist groups to non-violent mainstream organisations who seek this goal through the ballot box. Post-Islamism then is an attempt to characterise the transformation of those Islamist movements who move from this goal towards becoming socially-conservative political parties that accept the rules of a civil, democratic, pluralist system and no longer advocate for the imposition of sharia law but which maintain an Islamic reference as their inspiration. The source of this transformation, as Olivier Roy put it, was that Islamism had failed to capture the state and had exhausted its revolutionary zeal. 2 Instead, Islamist movements fragmented into 'neofundamentalism', effectively morality-focused activism, and normalised, nationalist, conservative political parties, which advocated elections, political coalitions, and democracy. 3 It was the very involvement in the political process, in this reading, that secularised Islamist movements. Another approach presented this evolution as less a historical development and more a conceptual rethinking. Asef Bayat characterised post-Islamism as 'both a condition and a project': condition, in that this exhaustion forced a reinvention of Islamism, and project, in that there was a conscious effort to conceptualise a way to transcend the Islamism of the past towards a new discourse of ambiguity, inclusion, and compromise. 'Whereas Islamism is defined by the fusion of religion and responsibility, post-Islamism emphasises religiosity and rights', Bayat wrote. 4 How much do these explanations explain Ennahdha's transformation? Ennahdha emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s as a group focused on religious ethics, Quranic study, and
proselytising. In 1981 it adopted a distinctly political path in the name of the Mouvement de la tendance islamique (Harakat al-ittijah al-islami, MTI), challenging the authoritarian rule of Habib Bourguiba. What is striking about the movement, though, is that even at this early stage the question of applying the sharia as a discrete set of laws was downplayed and there was a clear endorsement of political pluralism, several years ahead of Islamist movements elsewhere in the region. In other words, elements of the post-Islamist turn were present from the early years. The MTI's first programme included what might be considered a claim to establish an Islamic state in that it argued for the establishment of a 'contemporary image of the Islamic system of government'. 5 However, in the following years it rapidly committed itself to the democratic process and, by the late 1980s, to working within a civil, democratic state. This transformation was not without its internal critics, however. Some of the earliest members left the movement in the late 1970s to form the small Progressive Islamists group, because they argued the then MTI was not yet ready for a political path. Others split off in the mid-1980s to form small, hard-line groups, some of which were involved in acts of violence. Again in the early 1990s a small number, including cofounder Abdelfattah Mourou, left the movement in protest at what they saw as its overly-aggressive approach. During the two decades of repression that followed tensions remained between those living in exile abroad and the thousands of members enduring long jail terms in Tunisian prisons.
These internal debates over policy and strategy continue.
Yet, despite these tensions, the movement in its formal positions adopted a commitment to the democratic process (the movement conceded defeat after losing the October 2014 legislative elections), non-violent political change, political pluralism, and freedom, which party leaders framed as being among the maqāsid al-sharīʿa, the higher objectives of the Islamic sharia. Strictly speaking the movement has not formally abandoned its goal of applying sharia, but rather postponed it for the long term until, Ennahdha says, there is a more just economic system and the Tunisian population understands and is willing to accept the implications. In one sense this is radical, in that Ennahdha has moved significantly away from the main Islamist current as represented by the Muslim Brothers in Egypt. At the same time, though, it has become a deeply conservative political party, that stands for identity, traditions, and culture, and which places the family, not the individual, as the most important unit in society. In fact it is these issues that the movement talks about in public, rather than the question of Islam, which is often downplayed in a country where public signs of piety are much more widespread and the religious space more diverse than when the movement first emerged as the champion of Islam in the 1970s. a civil party with an Islamic reference that seeks reform and one of its aims is to construct and it doesn't aim to destroy the foundations of the republic, but rather to establish a state of justice and development, and a society of tolerance and pluralism and human rights, without denying our Arab-Islamic space and without being alienated from real, daily life.
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The reconciliation of these two positions, a society of justice, tolerance, and pluralism that also respects a cultural identity, remained the challenge for Ennahdha as it sought to adapt to the new political freedoms on offer and the new compromises required since the 2011 uprising.
Competing visions of identity
The second context through which this article considers Ennahdha's position on freedom of expression is the ongoing and still inconclusive historical competition over Tunisia's national identity, which is broadly between Tunisia's Arab and Islamic past and the Westernisation favoured by Bourguiba in particular from the mid-1950s onwards. Ennahdha has long emphasised the cultural element of its programme, a search for authenticity in a nation perceived as alienated from its own culture. In this sense the movement's reassertion of the Arab-Islamic project since 2011 is also its engagement in a long and unresolved debate over Tunisia's national identity that began in the Bourguiba era. These are what Sami Zemni calls 'political battles over historical memory ', 13 and are a result of the decades-long competition over political power, symbols, and discourse, between the secularising regimes of Bourguiba and Ben Ali, and the Islamist movement.
Alternatively put, after the uprising these were not battles about the shape of the political system, since views on this soon became virtually unanimous, nor about rival political ideologies, but rather about 'the "ways of life" of Tunisians,' namely the correct beliefs and conduct appropriate for post- safeguarding their individual ways of life and about the attendant conception of freedom they imagined,' argues Malika Zeghal. Most of these prosecutions, though not all, took place under the coalition government led by Ennahdha after its victory in the October 2011 elections and as a result some Tunisians argued these cases were evidence of an ideologically-driven climate of restricted freedoms that heralded an Islamist illiberalism. Nadia Jelassi, head of fine arts at the Institut Supérieur des Beaux Arts de
Tunis, was charged with undermining public morality for her sculpture depicting the torsos of three veiled women sinking into a circle of stones at the Printemps des Arts festival. Although she was never put on trial, she argued the attempted prosecution and Ennahdha's public position left artists feeling extremely vulnerable and facing a 'culture of permanent ambiguity'. 'The question of liberty for me is fundamental. It is the freedom to criticise everything, including religion and ideas, of course. Criticising religion doesn't mean mocking Muslims. To criticise is not to insult,' she said. 19 A second artist, facing a similar charge for an artwork displayed in the same exhibition, left the country after receiving death threats.
However, the connection between the prosecutions and Ennahdha was not always clear. The free speech prosecutions were brought not under new laws introduced by Ennahdha but under the Ben Ali-era penal code, which remained unreformed, ambiguous, and highly problematic. One of the most commonly used articles in these prosecutions was article 121.3 of the criminal code, which set a jail term of between six months and five years for anyone convicted of acts to 'disturb public order or undermine public morality'. This law had been used under Ben Ali to prosecute political dissidents, and was used again after the 2011 uprising to prosecute the cases against Mejri, the Facebook blogger, Karoui, the Nessma television director, and the artist Jelassi. In the case against the rapper Weld El 15, whose song criticized the police, other articles were used: article 125, which set a punishment of up to a year in jail for insulting a public servant in the course of his or her duties; article 247, which set up to six months in jail for defaming a public official; and article 226, which prohibited the hampering of public morality or decency through acts or words.
Not only did the penal code remain unreformed, but with it the judiciary. Judicial reform was limited in the first three years after the uprising, apart from the summary dismissal Jaafar, speaker of parliament and head of the Ettakatol party, issued a joint statement criticising not only the violent protests but also the artists themselves. They denounced the 'attack on the sacred', which they said was not an example of freedom of opinion or expression but was intended to provoke discord in fragile times. 21 Mehdi Mabrouk, the then culture minister and not an Ennahdha member (although he had been a member of the MTI in the early 1980s), said in a press conference at the time that though art may sometimes be provocative it should not 'attack sacred symbols'. 22 In other cases some criticised free expression when it was directed against the institutions of state.
Marzouki, the president and former CPR leader, grew increasingly frustrated with the personal attacks both he and the 'troika' coalition government faced in the media and he described the press as a counter-revolutionary force guilty of 'disinformation, absurd opinion polls, the worst bad faith and exploiting rumours, slurs and insults to destabilize the "troika"'. 23 In July 2014, after Ennahdha had resigned from government, the appointed prime minister, Mehdi Jomaa, reacted to the killing of 15 soldiers by Islamist militants in the Chaambi mountains by ordering the closure of a radio and a television station as well as several mosques and dozens of charitable associations, all of which he said had been inciting violence against the state. Frustration with the sudden emergence of a free, vibrant, and critical public debate was not confined to Ennahdha. Ennahdha condemned the violence of the demonstration, but also described el-Fani as 'provocative'.
Ennahdha and the question of free speech
Nourredine Arbaoui, the party's spokesman at the time, said:
The question of not believing in God is a question of freedom of opinion. God has given man all the freedom not to believe in him. But to present herself on Tunisian television and to say she doesn't believe in God and that she's in a war against Islamists, that's something else. That's something provocative. In considering the nature of critiques of religious belief, Ennahdha leaders did seek to draw out the difference between intellectual criticism, which they regarded as legitimate, and insults or offence, which they regarded as dangerous and provocative. the act involved, and in part it was about the tone and manner of the criticism. This argument draws a line between rational and emotional argument, as if one was more valuable than the other. Zied
Ladhari, a lawyer and Ennahdha representative at the assembly, stressed this difference:
We distinguish between what we consider red lines and what we consider criticisms or reflections of intellectual tradition, which are absolutely important for the freedom of every society. We need to create some division between the two things. When you go to a library in Tunis you will find the books of Nietzsche, for example. When we are dealing with philosophical ideas, intellectual production you are free to develop your ideas. But when you are insulting people, when you are attacking personally some person in their reputation and their private life there are legal provisions forbidding that behaviour. When you are using words to denigrate and insult, when you are not criticising the religion but insulting the people who believe in that religion, then we have to distinguish between the two things.
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Although the issue of intention was behind this division between intellectual criticism and mere insult, the question of intent did not appear in any of the written proposals Ennahdha put forward for its plans for 'protection of the sacred'. Nevertheless there was a moral order behind Ennahdha's provisions that appeared to allow room for intellectual debate but which excluded provocation or insult. Artists, in particular, did not seem to fall within the protections Ennahdha applied to intellectual debate. In interviews with Ennahdha members there was a frequent sense that artists were members of a secular elite who were intent on using the new post-uprising freedoms to provoke the Islamists or to advocate for a secular political cause by criticising religion. Tiss, the young Ennahdha deputy, said:
The artist has to have in mind that they are not the only ones who live in Tunisia. There are other people with other ideas. Because of this political polarisation and this sharp political conflict they do not want to believe that Ennahdha is for freedom of speech … this is why all the artists' works are provocative. It is not that art should be away from politics but away from exploitation by political parties.
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Although there were no formal efforts to limit artistic expression, there was a clear sense among Ennahdha members that provocative art was destabilising and encouraged conflict and that this was against their sense of the correct moral order for society. 33 Zied Ladhari, author interview, Tunis, 1 July 2013. 34 Tiss, author interview. 
Free speech in the constitution
The We lived 23 years with articles that said freedom of expression was limited by a law that protects public order and the authorities interpreted this however they wanted. We want to avoid this and to protect all freedoms in general … Freedom of expression is a magnificent gift of the revolution. Ennahdha's position throughout the constitutional drafting process was constrained in many ways. Sometimes deputies from rival parties managed to introduce compromises and impose concessions that restricted Ennahdha's ambitions, particularly with growing public pressure for a conclusion to the long-drawn out constitutional drafting process. Broader public reactions also constrained Ennahdha, for example the sharp public reaction against the movement's early effort to endorse sharia law as a source of legislation and the persistent criticism of its perceived laxity towards Salafist violence. In addition the internal disputes within Ennahdha itself, often disguised behind ambiguous public pronouncements, forced the movement to step carefully in order to maintain unity. Occasionally these differences surfaced in public. For example, during voting on the constitutional article protecting freedom of expression, 16 deputies in the assembly backed an amendment that would have criminalized attacks on the sacred, specifying the sacred to mean God, the Quran, and the Prophet. The amendment was withdrawn before a vote but among its supporters were 10 Ennahdha deputies, including the hawkish Habib Ellouz and one member of the Commission of Rights and Freedoms, Nejib Mrad, a journalist and early member of the movement. 44 In another session, 17 Ennahdha representatives voted for a failed amendment that would have taken away the state's protection of freedom of conscience. 45 The movement was not as united as it claimed to be.
There was still the question of protecting the sacred, which also affected the limits drawn around freedom of expression. The first draft of the constitution in mid-2012 included a role for the state as the guarantor of religion and gave the state the power to 'criminalize all attacks on the sacred' (tujarrim kul iʿtidāʾ alaā al-muqaddasāt al-diniyya). 46 However, this provoked much public debate and criticism and the wording was withdrawn, an early concession by Ennahdha. Yet
Ennahdha representatives in the months that followed clearly regarded the sacred as still in need of protection. Monia Ibrahim, the Ennahdha representative on the rights and freedoms commission, said:
The sacred (al-muqaddasāt) is clear for Muslims. All we are asking is for respect of these sacred elements. There should be a kind of respect to these sacred elements in the way that others would respect our belief in the sacred.
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They received advice from the outside experts on human rights and constitution drafting who spoke to the assembly and who told them it was not suitable to include articles of criminalization within the constitution, but that this should be dealt with later and separately as legal amendments to the penal code. Yet a similar formulation gradually made its way back into the final document, though this time without any criminalizing element. By April 2013 the draft constitution gave the state the right to 'protect' the sacred and by the final version, in January 2014, the state's right to protect against harm to the sacred was explicit and placed in the prominent first stage of the constitution ahead of the section dealing specifically with rights and freedoms. This element was included in the long and ambiguous Article 6, which had been the subject of several amendments and several votes.
The final article decreed that the state guaranteed freedoms of belief, of conscience, and of worship, and gave the state the right to 'protect the sacred' and prevent 'harm' to it (himāya al-muqaddasāt wa manʿ al-naīl minha). It also said the state was committed to spreading the values of moderation and tolerance and to preventing calls to takfīr, declaring another Muslim to be an unbeliever. drafting process. This reveals the process of post-Islamist evolution is shaped not just by internal ideological evolution but also by the compromises imposed by being in government and by being forced to negotiate with an opposition and to answer media critics. In fact within the movement, arguments often remain unresolved and were cloaked in ambiguity. Bayat's conceptual postIslamist shift from 'religion and responsibility' to 'religiosity and rights' had in this case merely been delayed, not fully embraced. Thus, for example, the resulting Article 6 was vague and contradictory. It defended freedom of conscience, which implied the right to change one's religious conviction and to express this change freely. However, the article also gave the state broad power to prevent unspecified harm to the unspecified ' sacred', a formulation that would give judges and politicians much leeway in writing judgments or laws that restricted rival interpretations of religion or critiques of religious belief.
Conclusion
In Ennahdha deployed a conservative moral code when its leaders spoke out in public against the 'provocations' of art exhibitions or bloggers or television directors or singers who they perceived as infringing the values of the 'sacred'. In mid-2012 it drew up a draft law banning blasphemy, which although never debated, revealed the thinking behind the movement's conception of free speech restrictions. These ideas were challenged during the long process of drafting the new constitution, when secular opponents of Ennahdha advocated in favour of individual freedoms as a safeguard against the over-reach of the state. Ennahdha, on the other hand, argued for a 'consensus' view of Tunisian identity in which restricting freedom of expression would encourage tolerance, prevent division, and uphold public order rather than allowing a descent into 'anarchy'. The movement insisted that the state play a role as a guarantor of these freedoms through regulation. In part this was framed as coming into line with international law, but the movement introduced the concept of 'protection of the sacred' to give the state vague and ambiguous powers to act to prevent harm to religious values. For Ennahdha this was what it meant to defend freedoms while at the same time to espouse a religious reference and to defend an Arab-Islamic identity.
